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Fetal Tissue Transplantation: 
An Ethical Analysis 
by 
Mark A. Roessler, S.T.L. 
Father Roessler is pastor of the Church of the Annunciation. Washington. D. C. 
Fetal tissue research has been going on for decades in the United States. In the 
early years of research, tissue was used in developing particular cell lines and for 
safety testing of vaccines. In the last fifteen years, after numerous animal studies, 
medical technology has made it possible to use fetal tissue for transplantation in 
humans.1 Such transplantation research is now being done in three areas. Human 
fetal liver tissue and thymus tissue are being transplanted into patients in the attempt 
to treat inherited and acquired diseases of the blood and of the immune system, as 
well as inherited diseases of metabolism. For example, transplants have been 
performed on patients with DiGeorge's syndrome, severe combined immune 
deficiency (SCID), leukemia, aplastic enemia, inherited metabolic disorders, as well 
as persons injured by radiation. Transplantation for DiGeorge's syndrome is now 
the treatment of choice for that particular disease. Transplantation, however, for the 
other diseases is still on the experimentalleve1.2 Fetal pancreatic tissue is now being 
used for the treatment of type I diabetes. Early results of such experimental 
transplantations indicate no adverse reactions and good cell-survival rates, with 
insulin requirements reduced in some cases.3 Animal studies have indicated that 
transplanting fetal neural tissue from the brain, spinal cord and peripheral nervous 
system may offer significant therapeutic benefit for a variety of neurologic disorders 
and trauma. For example, there has been success in treating patients with 
Parkinson's disease, a common degenerative neurologic illness.4 There is debate 
within the scientific and medical communities over the therapeutic benefit of fetal 
tissue transplantation into humans. The experiments carried out so far look 
promising but they are still at a very early stage. 
The common source of fetal tissue for research and therapy purposes is from 
induced or spontaneous abortions. Fetal tissue is preferred to adult tissue because it 
is believed to:s 
• be less likely to trigger an immunological response 
• be easier to culture, proliferate, and transplant 
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• grow more rapidly and to be more adaptable 
• possess greater potential for restoring damaged tissue and biochemical function 
• be more resistant to lack of oxygen 
• be exceptionally adaptable to a new environment 
• be able to stimulate the growth of new blood vessels 
By far the greatest percentage of fetal tissue comes from induced abortions 
because they provide the fresh and healthy tissue required by transplantation 
research. Tissue from spontaneous abortions is less preferred because spontaneous 
abortions cannot be planned like induced abortions and so cannot be depended 
upon to yield the tissue when it is needed. Also, spontaneous abortions are often due 
to some type of fetal abnormality, an abnormality that must not be passed on to a 
patient receiving the transplanted tissue. 
The use of tissue from induced aborted fetuses has brought a ban on the use of 
federal funds to support research. Research using private funds, however, is 
continuing. This ban came about as a result of a proposal by a National Institute of 
Health (NIH) researcher in 1988 to transplant tissue from electively aborted fetuses 
into patients with Parkinson's disease. The research proposal was approved by an 
institutional review board at NIH, but approval was withheld by Dr. James 
Wyngaarden, the Director of the NIH, until he received the opinion of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as to the propriety of funding 
research in this area. In March, 1988, the Assistant Secretary for HHS, Dr. Robert 
Windom, in a letter to the Director of NIH, placed a moratorium on the funding of 
fetal tissue transplantation research until an NIH appointed advisory committee 
could answer ten questions posed by him. The committee answered the questions 
and in December, 1988 a majority of its members approved the use of fetal tissue 
from induced aborted fetuses for human transplantation purposes.6 Dr. Louis 
Sullivan, the Secretary of HHS responded to the committee's report in a letter 
written on November 2, 1989 to Dr. William Raub, Acting Director of NIH. In this 
letter the Secretary indicated his desire to continue the moratorium on federal 
funding of research in which human fetal tissue from induced abortions is 
transplanted into human recipients. One of the reasons Sullivan gave for his 
decision was his belief that permitting human fetal research will increase the 
incidence of abortion across the country.7 
This paper will not seek to resolve the debate in the scientific/medical 
community over the therapeutic benefit of fetal tissue transplantation in humans. 
Nor will this paper seek to address the public policy issue surrounding this issue. 
Rather this paper is concerned with several ethical issues raised by the use of fetal 
tissue from induced abortions. The paper will first analyze the three competing 
ethical models for the use of human fetal tissue. The paper will then analyze the 
issues of complicity, inducement, and consent as they relate to this issue. The paper 
will conclude with an evaluation of the ethical issues from the perspective of the 
Vatican document Instruction on Respect for HumtUI Life in Its Origin and the 
Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day. 
The Ethical Models 
Three distinct models are employed to determine the ethics of the transplantation 
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of fetal tissue obtained from induced abortions. Each assign the fetus a different 
moral and legal status: the fetus as a body part of the mother, the fetus as a cadaver 
and the fetus as a human research subject.8 The first model views the fetus as a body 
part of the mother and treats it like any other body part removed at surgery. Such 
body parts are routinely employed in medical diagnostic and research activities. The 
necessity of informed consent from the mother for the use of the fetal tissue is the 
only ethical concern raised by this mode1.9 This model permits consent to be given 
prior to the abortion and seeks only the woman's consent to use the tissue. The 
father would have no right to veto the use of the tissue since it is seen as part of the 
mother's body.IO This first model differs from the other two which acknowledge 
that the fetus is a unique individual whose genetic constitution is unequivocally 
different from the mother. This model, in other words, does not acknowledge that 
there are two organisms involved. II 
The second model treats the dead fetus as a cadaver. It recognizes the humanity 
and individuality of the fetus and so considers the aborted fetus to be analogous to 
any other dead person who has not expressed an opinion regarding donation of his 
or her body.12 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), which gives legal 
guidelines for organ donation in the United States, allows another party to give 
consent for the donation. It even allows the donation of fetal tissue and organs by 
the parents based on their own needs, concerns, and interests since the wishes of the 
deceased fetus are unknown. The UAGA permits either parent to have veto power 
over the use of the tissue. 13 
The analogy used by the second model (i.e., the dead fetus is like an adult 
cadaver) may be weak for several reasons.14 First, in adult cases the best interests 
and wishes of the potential donor are being considered. It is difficult to believe that a 
mother or others who had the fetus aborted are concerned about the fetus' best 
interests. Second, organ donation in the case of unavoidable death may be a means 
of obtaining some good from a tragic situation. It is entirely different if the death of 
the donor is arranged ahead of time as occurs frequently in fetal tissue procurement. 
Third, in the case of induced abortion, consent for fetal tissue research is often 
obtained while the fetus is alive to insure fresh, healthy tissue. Since the fetus at this 
point is definitely not a cadaver, it is difficult to see how the cadaver donor analogy 
applies. 
The third model treats the fetus as a human research subject. It recognizes the 
humanity and individuality of the fetus as well as the ethical constraints imposed by 
them. IS However, is it appropriate to treat a dead fetus as if it were alive? 
The first ethical model is generally ot concerned about the ethical issues discussed 
below. The only ethical issue that may concern it is consent, that is, the need to 
obtain the woman's consent for the use of "her" tissue. These issues however, are a 
concern for the other two models because they recognize the fetus as a unique 
individual possessing dignity and certain rights. 
Complicity 
The use of tissue from induced aborted fetuses has raised the question of 
complicity, that is, does the researcher who uses such tissue or who permits such use, 
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become party, after the fact, to the destruction of the unborn?16 Both sides of the 
issue will be given below. 
Complicity 
One can discern four types of moral complicity in evil: active collaboration in the 
deed; indirect association that implies approval; failure to prevent the evil when 
possible; shielding the perpetrator from penalty. 17 The second type best describes the 
type of involvement the researcher has with the abortionist. The researcher involved 
in this type of complicity is not actually joining in the work itself but somehow 
enters into a supportive alliance. The researcher becomes an associate by resorting 
to the abortionist as a ready supplier of tissue from unborn humans who have been 
intentionally destroyed. By benefiting in the abortionist's injurious behavior, the 
researcher places him or herself in silent but unmistakable alliance with what the 
abortionist is doing. IS 
This second type of complicity is analogous to that condemned by the 
Nuremburg Code of 1946. The German physicians found guilty at the Nuremburg 
trials argued that they were only using the brains obtained from executed Jews for 
the good of all humankind. They contended the guilt lay with the SS who did the 
executions and not with them. These physicians stated they had an "ethical 
imperative" to make use of what was provided them from the concentration camps. 
The Nuremburgjudges rejected these arguments. 19 The physicians also argued that 
the imprisonment, torment, and killing of the Jews would have happened with or 
without their participation. The physicians here failed to understand that their 
professional presence and the use of the corpses of executed Jews in their research 
offered endorsement and legitimacy to the exterminators and established them as 
accomplices in the exterminations. The Nuremburg trials make the point that one 
need not cause a wrongful act to be party to it; it is enough to have abetted it.20 
Nuremberg teaches that when the bodies of people are forcibly delivered up to be 
used as some want, then no antecedent good and no subsequent good will absolve 
those who have been confederates in their oppression.21 The complicity between 
Nazi exterminators and physicians was recognized in 1988 when the chief of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) barred the use of data from Nazi 
experiments on concentration camp prisoners in an EPA report on the human 
effects of a toxic gas. The chief was influenced by a letter from twenty-two EPA 
employees who questioned the use of unethically obtained data and expressed 
doubt about the scientific value of such information.22 
Governments and not just researchers or physicians can be guilty of complicity. 
Consider, for example, the following analogy of a banker who judges narcotics to be 
a tragedy, but agrees to launder the proceeds from the local drug network to make 
more capital available to his clientele. Who should believe his readiness to accept 
those funds is not an act of association - indeed, of partnership, in the human 
tragedies that such moneys have already purchased? The banker has become a 
party to destruction even though it was complete before his involvement. The point 
of this analogy is that it is indeed possible to become a complicit party to abuse, after 
the fact, by enacting an agreement with those who exploit, to take further advantage 
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of their victims. The systematic use of electively aborted human remains in federally 
funded research would make the U.s. government a complicit party, after the fact, 
to those abortions just as surely as the German research made the researchers 
accomplices, after the fact, of the military personnel who had executed the research 
subjects.23 Since the implication of endorsement is a necessary concomitant of 
funding, funding must be eschewed in order to avoid the complicity inherent in the 
funding relationship.24 It is difficult to see how the use of fetal tissue from induced 
abortions can be institutionalized without threatening a morally unacceptable 
collaboration with the abortion industry.2S Even if a person could insure that there 
was no one-to-one correspondence between an individual case of abortion and the 
subsequent use of the fetal tissue, our society bears the ultimate responsibility for 
both by condoning such activity.26 
No Complicity 
A number of arguments is given to refute the charge of complicity. First, the 
researcher does not seem to be cooperating either formally nor materially.27If the 
will or intent is absent, researchers are not necessarily implicated in a system about 
which they may feel moral opprobrium if the medical benefits promised are 
proportionate to the use of fetuses from elective abortion.28 Even though the 
researchers involved in transplantation may feel remorse or regret, they are not 
objectively guilty of cooperation in a system about which they may have moral 
questions, since they are not assisting in abortions themselves. Those who argue for 
complicity fail to recognize the important distinction between the foreseen and the 
intended aspects of a human act.29 If direct benefit from a wrong grounds 
complicity, then the fire fighter (an all his/her dependents, heirs, creditors, etc.) is 
complicit with the arsonist; and the transplant surgeon and recipient are complicit 
with unsafe driving that provide brain dead bodies for organ transplants.30 The 
researchers are able to disassociate themselves from induced abortions as long as 
conception and abortion are not premeditated means of procuring fetal tissue.31 
Second, the analogy to Nazi experimentations is weak. These experimentations 
are reprehensible not first and foremost because they represent acts of coopertion, 
but because they lacked authority insofar as they lacked informed consent 32 Also, 
one could use the results of such experiments without approving the horrendous 
acts of Nazi doctors that made such knowledge possible. People may reasonably 
view such use as retrospectively honoring the victims rather than approving their 
victimization.33 
There are as well major differences between the Nazi experimentations and fetal 
tissue transplantation research. The former were not medical research projects 
intended to help the victims of Parkinson's and other diseases. Nor were they 
scrutinized by peer reviews, examined by NIH panels, publicized by the media, 
open to public questioning, debated in Congress, and challenged by the 
administration.34 
Also, unlike the Nazi experimentations, the fetal tissue transplantation research 
does not harm fetuses. They are not,aborted to advance research and are dead when 
the research occurs.35 
Third, it is unclear how complicity can be involved since the researcher and 
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patient will ordinarily be removed from the abortion process; they will not have 
requested it; and will have no knowledge of who performed it or where it occurred. 
The abortion will have occurred for reasons unrelated to tissue procurement, and 
the tissue will be procured by a third party.36 Real or apparent conflicts of interest 
can be avoided if the distinction found in the analogous situation of organ retrieval 
from living or cadaver donors is maintained between the physician who performs 
an abortion for a pregnant woman and the physician who transplants fetal tissue 
into the body of another patient 37 Once dead the fetus clearly lacks interests and can 
no more be exploited or harmed than can any cadaver.38 
Fourth, if infant or adult murder victims may be used for research, therapy, or 
education, there is no apparent reason why fetal victims should not be used as well 
since the patient and physician benefiting from the murder do not applaud it or enter 
into a supportive alliance with the murderer. In other words, physicians may benefit 
from or make use of induced abortions without also approving of the abortionist's 
causative act. Even later approval or applause of the abortions would not make the 
physician an accomplice in an abortion that has already occurred. Physicians or 
patients are not accomplices in the prior evil merely by seeking to achieve some 
good from a contingent event over which they had no control. 39 (Those who argue 
for complicity make the point here that if the physician contractd with the murderer 
to provide him organs for transplantation, told him when and where the organs 
would be made available, arranged for the physician or his agents to be present to 
harvest the organs and reimbursed the murderer for any expenses incurred in 
making the organs available - these physicians would be guilty of complicity. 
These types of arrangements are routinely made to obtain fetal tissue.40) 
Fifth, induced abortions will occur regardless of the needs of researchers. This 
indicates that the abortion and subsequent use are clearly independent from each 
other.41 
Sixth, while there is no intrinsic connection between research on fetal tissue and 
induced abortions, those involved in this form of research have an ethical 
responsibility to make sure that the distance between the two realities is kept clear. 
Several steps should be taken to ensure that researchers are not promoting induced 
abortions: a) No monies should be paid for fetal tissue. Hmoney can be made by 
becoming pregnant, then some type of commerce will probably be developed. (No 
fees should be paid to the woman to abort or to donate tissue. And no fees beyond 
actual expenses should be paid to abortion clinics to provide the tissue.) There are 
federal laws against the sale of organs for transplantation. It seems there should be 
federal laws prohibiting the sale of fetal tissue for research as well. b) The possibility 
of deriving fetal tissue from fetal tissue culture processes whose source is fetal tissue 
from spontaneous abortions should continue to be researched. The ethical issue 
concerning the source of supply of fetal tissue might be solved in this way. c) Fetuses 
should not be kept alive to obtain tissue. d) Induced abortions should not be 
performed solely or primarily to get tissue for transplantation. e) Consent for the use 
of the fetal tissue should be obtained from the woman only after she has decided to 
have an abortion. There should be no discussion in abortion counseling about using 
tissue from the aborted fetus for possible therapeutic purposes.42 These five steps are 
seen by many as sufficient to separate the researcher from induced abortions as such. 
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Inducement for Abortion 
As we saw above, Secretary of Health and Human Servi~ Louis Sullivan, 
continued the moratorium on federal funding of research in which human fetal 
tissue from induced abortions is transplanted into human recipients because he 
believed, among other reasons, that permitting human fetal tissue research will 
increase the incidence of abortion across the country :43 
Inducement 
The argument for inducement is made in several ways. First, the routine 
beneficial use of human fetal tissue will legitimate abortions previously considered 
immoral such that moral immoral abortions may be expected to occur.44 Such 
beneficial use could be a powerful inducement for women to have an abortion, that 
is, they could more easily justify their action by having something "good" come 
from it. Abortion decisions are often very difficult for women, so the appeal to 
beneficence might be highly manipulative of women. The prospect of fetal tissue 
transplantation offers a powerful argument in the hands of abortion clinic 
counselors who could counsel that having an abortion can be good for humanity. 
Such an argument may be a powerful additional reason to go through with the 
abortion.4s Even in the absence of direct interpersonal pressure, the beneficence of 
giving up a fetus for the sake of a disease victim will be widely discussed in society 
and hence likewise influence the woman.46 
Second, fetal tissue transplantation can also be reasonably expected to increase 
abortions due to financial incentives motivating abortion clinics. If fetal tissue 
transplants are successful the supply would not begin to meet the demand 47 
Third, if the medical research establishment becomes dependent on elective 
aborted fetuses, an irreversible institutional and economic bond between abortion 
centers and biomedical science will have been established Medical science could 
have a great deal at stake in the continual flow of elective aborted fetuses. With the 
advent of widespread fetal tissue transplantation, induced abortions would no 
longer be a political issue that biomedical researchers could ignore. Rather, 
livelihoods and institutional grants would demand that induced abortions be 
continued If this happens there might be no turning back because of the symbiotic 
relationship which would arise between medical and scientific progress.48 
No Inducement 
The inducement arguments are countered in various ways. It is argued that the 
ultimate impact of fetal tissue transplantation on the incidence of induced abortions 
is simply unknown, and so research should be allowed to continue for a while to 
determine if abortions do increase. The risk of some increase, however, should not 
justify a total ban.49 Also, there is a sufficient amount of fetal tissue available today 
from induced abortions for transplantation so no increase in abortions is likely to 
result.so 
Various safeguards can be-implemented to prevent or minimize inducement. 
First, to avoid any conOict of interest that might affect their advice to patients about 
abortion, medical personnel who perform induced abortions should not be allowed 
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any direct benefit from the subsequent use of the fetal tissue. Second, women who 
undergo induced abortions should not be allowed to benefit directly from the 
subsequent medical use of the fetal tissue, through payment for it, through the 
reimbursement of expenses connected with the abortion, by designating who will 
receive the tissue, or in any other manner. Third, the National Organ 
Transplantation Act should be amended to cover human fetal tissue, whether 
used for transplantation or any other medical purpose; and to exclude abortion-
related expenses from its definition of permissible reimbursements.s1 Fourth, 
permission to use tissue from the aborted fetus should be obtained only after the 
woman has made the decision to have the abortion. Fifth, the physicians 
performing the abortion and those performing the transplant should be distinct. 
Consent 
The necessity of obtaining consent to donate fetal tissue is closely related to the 
three ethical models discussed above. If the fetus is viewed as just a part of the 
mother, then no more consent is needed for such a donation than for the donation 
of any tissue specimen ofthe woman. However, this practice is inconsistent with 
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) which treats the dead fetus as a 
cadaver donor of tissue (the second ethical model). The third model, which treats 
the fetus as a human research subject maintains that the federal regulations for the 
protection of human subjects should apply to this type of research.s2 
If the first ethical model is accepted then there is little controversy surrounding 
consent. The consent ofthe woman having the abortion is sufficient. Ifthe second 
ethical model is accepted then the differences from normal organ donations from 
cadavers need to be noted. For example, when a family surrenders through proxy 
consent organs from a cadaver for transplant they have not been involved in 
causing the death of the person in qUCfStion. S3 Also, the criteria currently in use for 
defining death for the purpose of cadaveric organ donation from postnatal organ 
donors are not sufficient when applied to the fetus. This insufficiency is apparent 
in the unique physiological status of the fetus as compared with postnatal organ 
donors, as well as the fact that the medical personnel who would normally be 
called upon to make the diagnosis of death are either the agents of death (the 
abortion practitioners) or have a vested interest in the subsequent use ofthe tissue 
(the transplant personnel). New criteria need to be established for defining fetal 
death which would be compatible with obtaining tissue suitable for 
transplantation. However, such criteria are suspect when the necessity for 
developing them is driven by the desire to obtain viable fetal tissue.S4 
The third ethical model, which treats the fetus as a human research subject, 
maintains that informed consent cannot be obtained for an experimental 
procedure that calls for the willful killing of the research subject. ss It is a canon of 
ethical science since Nuremberg that no human being may be used for research 
without his or her voluntary consent. If a subject is unable to consent to research 
that might serve his or her own welfare, another person can give proxy consent: a 
parent for a minor child, a guardian for a mentally handicapped person, etc. In 
the case of the use of fetal tissue, a mother's power to act on her child's behalf is 
August, 1993 67 
grounded entirely upon her protective office and duty to provide for the child's 
benefit.S6 But the mother's decision to abort her child is an act of such violent 
abandonment of her protection and duty that no further exercise of such 
responsibility is admissible. 57 
Since this third model treats the fetus as a human research subject it is also 
concerned that the remains of an aborted fetus be treated with the dignity given a 
human body and not be treated as an impersonal object to be owned and used at 
will. 58 Human remains demand dignity because of the dignity owed to the 
persons when he or she was alive. To disregard that dignity after death discredits 
the dignity to be accorded the person while living and orients persons to treat 
others with contempt. 59 
Against this understanding of dignity it is argued that the key Question about 
the dignified treatment of human remains is what is done with them. If what is 
done is dignified then the remains are treated with dignity.60 In fact, greater 
dignity seems to be afforded fetal remains if they are used as a source of 
transplanted material rather then treated as organic trash. Also, the disposers of 
cadaveric remains are not the guardians or proxies of the deceased, who no 
longer has interests to be guarded. Rather their role is to guard their own feelings 
and interests in assuring that the remains of kin are treated respectfully.61 The 
absence of a positive warrant (i.e., proper consent from the mother or father or 
State, etc.) should be no bar to use of the tissue.62 
On the other hand, the UAGA teaches that human cadavers, organs and 
tissues must be treated as human subjects - not objects - of research, protected 
from arbitrary intrusion or seizure by the essential requirement of voluntary 
consent by the person (or that person's protector). It has been a longstanding 
moral conviction that a human body cannot be owned - it can only be held in 
trust. Therefore, fetal remains no more belong to the next-of-kin than an estate 
belongs to an executor. And when the only reason there is a fetal cadaver to be 
disposed of is that it was violently destroyed at the choice of his or her next-of-kin,. 
that survivor surely forfeits his or her right after death,just as he or she violated his 
or her duty before death, to provide the services of posthumous kinship. The 
unborn is not there to serve the interests of those who have him or her in their 
power.63 
In summary, it can be argued that no one is capable of giving authentic consent 
in the case of tissue donation from an induced abortion since there is no honest 
attempt to serve the best interest of the unborn.64 The mother is unable to give 
consent because when she resolves to destroy her unborn fetus she has abdicated 
her office and duty as the guardian of her offspring.65 There is no ground for 
claiming that the medical professionals who performed the abortion have rights 
over remains of aborted fetuses. This is especially true since death has resulted 
from nontherapeutic intervention with no consent by the victim.66 The 
prerogative,of the father to ~elease the remains of his aborted fetus for medical 
research is rarely considered, yet in comparable instance$ of significant parental 
guardianship neither parent is considered to act rightfully when he or she avoids 
cqnsultation or consensus with the other parent. The absence of their consent, 
unless the right to give it could credibly be assumed to have been waived, would 
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further encumber any others' claim to dispose ofthe remains.67 When the natural 
protectors of the weak have either deserted or abused ot absented themselves 
from their wards, guardianship usually devolves upon the State as parens patriae. 
But if the State agrees to consign to research the remains of those fetuses killed by 
induced abortions, that inevitably places the State in a position of patronage 
toward their destruction. The State would, like the aborting mother, also be 
implictly derelict in its protective powers.68 
Conclusion 
This paper will conclude with an evaluation of the moral issues presented 
above from the perspective the Vatican document, Instruction on Respect for 
Human Life in Its Origin and the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain 
Questions of the Day (Instruction).69 The Instruction asserts that a human being 
must be respected and treated as a person from the very first instant of his or her 
existence.7o Therefore from the same instant his or her rights as a person must be 
recognized, among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent 
human being to life.71 This understanding of the human personhood from the 
moment of conception is obviously incompatible with the understanding of the 
first ethical model which defines the fetus as no more than a body part of the 
mother. The Instruction rejects any research based upon such an understanding 
of the fetus. 
The Instruction permits medical research on live embryos as long as it does not 
involve risk to .the embryo's physical integrity or life by reason of the methods 
used or the effects induced.72 Fetal tissue research which uses tissue from live 
fetuses is ruled out by the Instruction because of the risk it imposes on the fetus.73 
Also, the Instruction does not allow parental consent for tissue transplantation to 
be given pre mortem since such consent is given for research which has no benefit 
for the fetus.74 
The Instruction does allow for experimental research or medical use of human 
embryo and fetal remains.7s They are to be treated with the same respect as other 
human remains, and so, can be used only under certain conditions. These 
conditions are: death must be verified; parental consent must be obtained; there 
must be no complicity in deliberate abortion, the risk of scandal must be avoided; 
and there must be no commercial trafficking in dead fetuses.76 
These conditions can be fulfilled if the fetal tissue used in transplantation 
comes from spontaneous abortions or ectopic pregnancies. But they seem 
impossible to fulfill if the tissue comes from induced abortions. The arguments 
given above demonstrate the problems of parental consent - how can parents 
presume to act in the best interest oftheir baby ifthey have chosen to abort him or 
her? The arguments above also demonstrate that complicity in abortion and 
scandal are impossible to avoid if the use of tissue from induced aborted fetuses is 
anything more than an isolated event. And if the medical use of fetal tissue 
becomes standard practice with most of it coming from induced abortions, a 
business-as-usual relationship will be established between researchers and the 
abortion indUstry.77 It is difficult to imagine that some type of commercial 
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transaction in fetal tissue will not result from such a relationship. 
In summary, the Instruction permits fetal tissue transplantation if the tissue is 
acquired from the remains of spontaneous abortions and ectopic pregnancies 
under the conditions mentioned above. The quantity and quality of tissue 
obtained in this way, however, limits the availability of such tissue for research 
and therapy. However, this limit may be overcome in the future through fetal cell 
cultures derived from such tissue. The possibility of growing fetal cells in culture 
is still in its early stages of research. If such culturing becomes possible it would 
remove the demand of acquiring fetal tissue from induced abortions and hence 
remove a major objection to fetal tissue transplantation research and therapy. 
In conclusion, fetal tissue transplantation is ethical if the source of the tissue is 
from a spontaneous abortion, an ectopic pregnancy, or fetal cell culture; and the 
conditions found in the Instruction for the use of the remains of human embryos 
and fetuses are fulfilled. 
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